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We present a simple model of the emergence of the division of labor and the development of a
system of resource subsidy from an agent-based model of directed resource production with vari-
able degrees of trust between the agents. The model has three distinct phases, corresponding to
different forms of societal organization: disconnected (independent agents), homogeneous coopera-
tive (collective state), and inhomogeneous cooperative (collective state with a leader). Our results
indicate that such levels of organization arise generically as a collective effect from interacting agent
dynamics, and may have applications in a variety of systems including social insects and microbial
communities.
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INTRODUCTION
To understand systems of social and political organi-
zation, it is tempting to begin by trying to understand
the individuals that form them. This approach quickly
runs into a problem—the behavior of individuals is very
hard to predict. The behavior of any given individual de-
pends upon a large number of factors: their culture, their
experiences to date, their genetics, the events they are
currently experiencing, their education, their economic
status, and so on. It seems as if understanding the be-
havior of a group is an impossible goal if predicting the
behavior a single person is so difficult. However, mod-
els of group behavior through agent-based modelling[1]
have been reasonably successful despite this, reproduc-
ing generic properties of the dynamics of crowds, mobs,
and riots[2, 3, 4]; collective opinion formation[5, 6, 7];
the structure of social groups[8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15];
and financial markets[16]. When large numbers of people
interact, there exists the possibility for the emergence of
collective effects which—surprisingly—are insensitive to
the details of the elements which comprise them. When
this occurs, the interactions between agents overwhelm
their individual dynamics; and although their may well
be many factors difficult to model for each individual’s
behavior, the interactions are frequently easier to specify,
characterize and model.
The purpose of this paper is to understand the factors
at work in setting up and maintaining the large scale
structure of societies from the point of view of an ab-
stract model. Other models[17] have analyzed the stabil-
ity and transitions of an established form of social order.
In this paper, we will instead seek to explain how social
order emerges from an unstructured state due to collec-
tive interactions between individual agents. This must
take into account that the connections between individ-
uals may change, leading to a situation in which one has
an active network[18].
The emergence of networks of preferred interactions
between agents has been observed in [19, 20]. The
resultant structure of agents is heterogeneous—a state
emerges in which some subset of the population (the lead-
ers) extracts maximal benefit. There is however no ex-
plicit flow of information from the leaders to the other
agents. We posit that the structure of information ex-
change in the system is a key element to the form of
political organization it possesses. We would like to dif-
ferentiate between the agent with the greatest payoff and
the agent whose decisions hold maximal weight in influ-
encing the decisions of others. In our model, we observe
the development of a division of labor from simple self-
ish behavior and communication between the members of
the system. The role of active information is central to
achieving this heterogeneous population structure. This
mechanism is not unique as far as ways in which the di-
vision of labor might emerge[21, 22]. Any system that
encourages specialization and provides some way for the
proceeds of labor to be redistributed may very well pro-
duce division of labor, and there are a number of propos-
als for how this might come about.
The mechanism studied in the present paper is differ-
entiated from earlier work because the method of redis-
tribution (information exchange) has the additional con-
sequence that networks of behavioral control can emerge
from the population. They are not mandatory conse-
quences of the dynamics, but only arise under certain
conditions specified by parameters in the model. Thus
our model does not function as a zero-sum game in which
there is exchange of a variety of resources. Information
exchange has been studied in various other models. How-
ever, in such models it is usually a passive variable, for
instance in voting and opinion formation models.
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2The role of active information—information used
to make a decision with either positive or negative
consequence—is less well known. In [23], active informa-
tion played the role of a diffusive field in a spatial pris-
oner’s dilemma model, and in [24], information was given
to a subset of members of a swarm to see how informed
decisions would propagate to determine the swarm direc-
tion. In these cases, the agents had no way of evaluating
the quality of the information they received—whether
it had in the past led to a good or bad decision. This
dynamics leads to information acting primarily as a ho-
mogenizing agent: it determines the average behavior in
[23], and directs the average swarm direction in [24]. On
the other hand, in our model, each agent determines the
optimal degree of trust to place in information received
from another. This ‘trust’, in other contexts such as a
political system or organizational structure, could be any
way in which control over an agent’s behavior is surren-
dered to one or more external agents. By giving each
agent the ability to tune its trust in the other members
of the system, it is possible for clusters to form in which
the members of the cluster have voluntarily given over
the reins of their decision making to a leader of their
choice.
This organization, in its simplest form, arises from uni-
form information exchange between the individuals in the
system, resulting in a homogeneous, shared information
pool. This corresponds to communal decision-making by
majority vote. In a system in which different agents are
better or worse at making decisions, one would expect
the emergence of a system of weighting by reputation,
simply as a tool to optimize the decision-making process.
If, however, resources can be allocated towards making
better decisions, it becomes possible for a subset of the
individuals to specialize in being an information source.
At this point, the majority of agents in the system will be
following instructions provided by a minority of agents,
without a significant information flow in the reverse di-
rection. These two phases—unstructured and structured
respectively—are distinct forms of political organization,
and which is achieved depends on the costs and benefits
associated with information generation.
A requirement for stability in the structured phase
is that the agents which are acting as an information
source must either gain from producing information or
lose if they fail to produce information, as they dedicate
their own resources into providing this information. In
modern governments, systems of taxation subsidize the
decision-makers, but the emergence of such structures is
difficult without a heterogeneous system already being
in place. Our results show that in certain circumstances,
the decision-making structure of a population may be-
come heterogeneous even without the inclusion of subsi-
dies or resource exchange, due to a collective effect where
the refusal to generate information by the majority of
the population forces the agents that are the last to act
to take on the decision-making role simply to preserve
their own benefit. From this phase, the introduction of
a resource subsidy would improve the efficiency of the
system, and could be done in a continuous manner. A
schematic phase diagram that qualitatively exhibits the
nature of the phases and transitions between them is il-
lustrated in Fig. (1).
MODEL
We propose the following model to capture the dynam-
ics of information exchange. The system consists of a set
of agents, each which can choose to distribute resources
to any other agents. In addition, each agent chooses to
allocate its time between producing resources or produc-
ing information about the environmental state (‘think-
ing’). Whether or not resource production is successful
depends on the accuracy of the agent’s guess as to the
current nature of its environment, which is randomly in
one of O possible states. If the agent guesses the environ-
mental state correctly, it produces a number of resources
proportional to the fraction of its time it allocated to
production. Furthermore, an agent can look to see what
other agents are guessing in order to determine its own
guess.
We assume in this first part that each agent has a num-
ber of degrees of freedom (how to combine information
from other agents, how many resources to distribute to
other agents, and how much time to allocate towards pro-
ducing resources) which are adjusted in order to maxi-
mize its average score. The immediate consequence of
this is that we may determine trivially what the trust
network should be, and thus determine our trust-network
order parameters in terms of the distribution of ’‘think-
ing’ values—the agent with the highest thinking value
will have the most trust directed at it, and if the think-
ing values are distributed homogeneously then trust will
also be distributed homogeneously. This treatment ne-
glects dynamical effects and fluctuations. Later, we will
analyze the effect of fluctuations and dynamics on the
stability of the various phases.
The base accuracy—that due to the agent’s own pro-
duction of information, is a nonlinear function of the frac-
tion of time dedicated towards information production T .
A successful guess then produces one resource per unit
time spent on resource generation. This results in a total
production of 1− T resources from a successful guess, or
zero from a failed guess. If we take the average perfor-
mance over many such trials, then we can derive a score
function that the system may try to optimize.
We must now determine how the accuracy depends on
the amount of time spent upon ‘thinking’. The choice
of functional form must satisfy a number of constraints.
The accuracy should monotonically increase with the
fraction of time dedicated towards it. Additionally, it is
3bounded above by 1 and below by 1/O (the accuracy of a
random guess). Given these constraints, we may choose
any function of the form A = (1/O + (1 − 1/O)f(T ))
where f(T ) is a monotonically increasing function that
maps the interval [0, 1] to itself.
The key character of our choice of function will be
the range of values of the other parameters for which
the score function has a local maximum in the interval
[0, 1]. The point at which this maximum appears or dis-
appears will control part of the resultant phase diagram.
If f(T ) is monotonically increasing, then the larger O is,
the more likely there is for there to be a maximum, and
the less concave up f is, the more likely there is to be
a maximum. This can be seen by calculating the con-
cavity of the total score function S at the location of its
extrenum in terms of an arbitrary f :
sgn(S
′′
) = sgn((1− x)2f ′′ − 2(f + 1
O − 1)) (1)
Consequently, the specific details of f(T ) should not
strongly influence the results. Its local derivatives in the
vicinity of the extrenum of S are the only relevant proper-
ties. If f(T ) is concave up, then specialization is favored.
If concave down, then there are diminishing returns and
even an infinitesimal amount of time dedicated towards
producing information will be beneficial. While we could
in principle combine an arbitrary number of concave up
and concave down regions in order to create a series of
optima in S, it is hard to justify that arbitrary compli-
cation.
A simple choice of function that allows us to smoothly
vary between concave up and concave down behavior
with a single parameter is A = (1/O + (1 − 1/O)Tα),
where α is a parameter of the model controlling the dis-
position of the social problem towards specialization or
generalization. If α > 1 then the function is concave up,
and specialization is favored. With this basis, we can
discuss a number of possible system configurations and
evaluate their average score for optimal choices of T .
While one could argue that we have put in the possibil-
ity of the existence of an optimum value of T by hand, it
is an allowed possibility given the most arbitrary choice
of f(T ). We are then exploring the consequences to the
phase diagram of political organization that result from
the existence of this optimum choice, rather than saying
that we have shown that fundamentally that optimum
must exist in real social systems. It is clear that in many
cases such as social insects there is such an optimum,
because in those systems specialization is favored over
generalization.
Disconnected, Homogeneous Phase
In the case that no agent in the system uses informa-
tion from any other agent, there is an optimal value of T
to maximize an agent’s score. The average score in this
phase ¯SDH is perforce independent of N .
¯SDH(T ) =
1
O
(1− T )(1 + (O − 1)Tα) (2)
The optimal value of T satisfies:
Tα−1(α− (α+ 1)T ) = 1
O − 1 (3)
If α = 1, then this value of T is always less than zero,
so T = 0 is the optimal choice. At larger values of α a
local maximum appears in the curve at a finite value of
O, and then becomes a global maximum as O increases.
The value of O at which the maximum value of the score
is equal to the value at T = 0 is O = 1 +αα/(α− 1)α−1.
In the limit of large α, this becomes O ≈ eα + (1 −
e/2). So in effect, for values of α > 1 (representing a
nonlinear reward for dedicating resources to ‘thinking’)
there is a first order transition between a ‘guessing’ phase
and a ‘thinking’ phase, where the more options there are,
the more valuable a resource spent on ‘thinking’ is. The
larger α is, the larger O must be for a non-zero thinking
phase to be optimal. The score function for various values
of α and O is plotted in Fig. 2.
An additional consideration is the effect of fluctuations
on this phase. If each agent may only specify their actual
thinking value to within some standard deviation, then
the resulting average score is lower than if fluctuations
had been absent. Near the limits of the range of the
thinking variable fluctuations are constrained such that
they may not take it outside of the range. For fluctua-
tions of magnitude σ around an optimal value of T , we
expect that the average score will change by:
∆S = σ2
d2S
dT 2
= σ2αTα−2((α−1)− (α+1)T )O − 1
O
(4)
For fixed α, as O becomes large the optimal value of
T approaches α/(α+ 1) and so the decrease in the score
approaches:
∆S = −α
(
α
α+ 1
)α−2
σ2 (5)
When the optimal solution is T = 0, however, the first
derivative is non-zero and so fluctuations have a linear
effect. The effect of this is that ∆S = σ dSdT /
√
pi assuming
Gaussian fluctuations. The slope of the score function
around T = 0 is:
4d ¯SDH
dT
= −1/O (6)
So we expect ∆S = −σ/(O√pi) to be the leading effect
at this point. The consequence of this is that sufficiently
large fluctuations will favor the T = 0 phase.
Connected, Homogeneous Phase
If communication between agents is permitted, but no
resource reallocation takes place, then the resulting ac-
curacy is higher than any of the individual accuracies
in the system (so this phase is always favored over the
disconnected phase for permitted values of T ).
For O = 2, the effective accuracy can be solved for in
the large N limit. If the initial accuracy is A, then the
total number of agents that pick the correct option C0
is C0 =
∑N
i ηi where ηi is either 1 (with chance A) or 0
(with chance 1−A). In the large N limit, C0 is described
by a Gaussian distribution with mean NA and standard
deviation A(1−A)√N .
The probability that the system picks the correct op-
tion is thus the probability that C0 > N/2. As the range
of permitted values is not infinite, care must be taken to
compute the correct normalization factor. So:
Aeff =
∫ N
N/2
exp(−( x−AN2NA(1−A) )2)∫ N
0
exp(−( x−AN2NA(1−A) )2)
(7)
which evaluates to
Aeff =
erf( (1−A)
√
N√
2A(1−A) )− erf(
(1/2−A)√N√
2A(1−A) )
erf( (1−A)
√
N√
2A(1−A) )− erf(−
A
√
N√
2A(1−A) )
(8)
where A(T ) = (1 + Tα)/2 in this case.
For O = 2 and α = 2, benefits from a non-zero value
of T do not appear until around N > 35. Figure 3 shows
the score function for the homogeneous, connected phase
compared with the isolated phase.
The effects of fluctuations are less obvious in this case,
because they must be considered each agent indepen-
dently, whereas this analysis is done for all agents be-
having in the same fashion. In the case of this model,
fluctuations may actually increase the effective score, as
a fluctuation to higher thinking rate in one agent benefits
the guesses of all other agents. Similarly, a decrease in
thinking rate in one agent will not significantly decrease
his accuracy but may increase his yield. This is a hint
that this particular phase is unstable to an inhomoge-
neous phase.
A rough estimate would suggest that when adding to-
gether the effects of fluctuations on each of the individual
agents, the effective size of fluctuations is reduced from
σ to σ′ = σ/
√
N . This has the consequence that the
connected, homogeneous phase is less sensitive to fluctu-
ations than the disconnected phase.
Connected, Inhomogeneous Phase
If the agents become inhomogeneous and divide their
labor between thinking and working, then structures in
which there is a directional information flow become pos-
sible. Given perfect communication and no fluctuations,
the optimal configuration will be that of a single agent
with high accuracy (T ), and N −1 agents with minimum
accuracy but always picking the action of the ‘leader’
agent. The average score for this phase is simply:
¯SCI =
(N − 1) + (1− T )(1/O + (1− 1/O)Tα
N
(9)
This phase in static conditions scores far better than the
homogeneous phases, but it is very susceptible to fluc-
tuations lowering the score, compared to the connected
homogeneous phase. The result of this is that neither the
pure homogeneous nor heterogeneous phases are realized.
In a fully-connected population with some form of noise,
the system produces a number of leaders L which scales
with the population size.
The inhomogeneous phase with a number of leaders
can always have a higher average score than the homo-
geneous phase, but is not generally stable when the in-
dividual scores are examined. Each leader agent can im-
prove their score by decreasing the portion of resources
they dedicate to thinking to the optimal value for the
disconnected phase. When the disconnected phase opti-
mal value is T is greater than zero, the inhomogeneous
phase may still occur. This occurs for small α, large O,
and small N . If α is too large, the height of the sec-
ondary maximum is decreased below that of the T = 0
score function maximum and a homogeneous T = 0 phase
occurs. If N is sufficiently large, the homogeneous con-
nected phase with nonzero T can outperform a phase
consisting of a single ‘selfish leader’. So there are first
order phase transitions in the space of O, α, and N be-
tween three phases: T = 0, leader, and homogeneous
connected (or ‘communal’ phase).
Resource Subsidy
We have so far shown that for certain values of the pa-
rameters, the inhomogeneous ‘leader’ phase is stable even
without the leaders being subsidized. The system has not
maximized its resource production in this phase—rather,
the limit on resource production is set by the cost to the
leader agent, in that even though it might produce a large
5amount of resources for others by changing its behavior,
doing so would decrease its own resource production.
If we allow agents to exchange resources as well as in-
formation, then starting from the connected, inhomoge-
neous phase it is possible to improve or keep constant
the scores of all agents. If we have a phase with a single
leader agent, then for that agent to dedicate more than
the disconnected optimal fraction of resources to think-
ing, it must be reimbursed by at least the same amount
of resources as it loses to increase the resources it spends
on thinking. This resource cost may then be absorbed
by the remaining N − 1 agents. In effect, the criterion of
selfish optimization becomes one of global optimization.
The globally optimal phase in the absence of fluctuations
is that with a single leader agent.
This need not be the case in general, as one may posit
the existence of cheaters: agents which do not give re-
sources towards the subsidy but still gain its benefits. A
system with multiple types of resource or multiple agen-
das, such as in [25] might also retain a more detailed
structure.
When fluctuations are added, it becomes beneficial to
have multiple leaders in order to reduce the impact of
fluctuations but retain the benefit of increased efficiency.
We use the connected, homogeneous solution for L agents
to determine the accuracy of the remaining N −L given
a known accuracy of the leaders. For simplicity, we will
assume that the leader agents have T = 1, which the op-
timal choice converges to as N  L. For a given level of
fluctuations, each leader will have an effective, adjusted
accuracy. We evaluate the score function numerically as
a function of L and find the location of the maximum
as a function of N . The results are plotted in Fig. 6.
At large N , the optimal number of leaders approaches
L ∝ log(N).
For a spatially distributed system, or one in which
there is not total connectivity, it is expected that such
effects will require a larger number of leaders to cover
the system extent. For example, in a two-dimensional
system in which agents can only communicate within a
radius R, a number of leaders proportional to
√
N/piR2
would be expected to ensure total coverage.
APPLICATIONS
The abstract model of emergent political systems that
we have outlined is capable of providing a framework in
which to analyze real social systems, and in this section
we briefly indicate some examples. It is important to
emphasize that our model is not required to model all
situations in which division of labor occurs—a simpler
model with only a nonlinear benefit to specialization and
some form of exchange of services would be sufficient to
enable division of labor to emerge. Such a process would
not need to involve information sharing as a core element.
On the other hand, our work shows that the emergence
of the leader phase (which corresponds to the occurrence
of a division of labor in other pictures) is primarily a
consequence of the special property of information when
compared to other resources that, once created, it can be
duplicated with a much smaller additional cost than the
cost to first generate it. This process of information am-
plification makes the leader phase described here distinct
from other scenarios that produce division of labor.
We must also be careful to understand the nature of the
relevant optimization being implicitly performed when
considering a given system. In human economic and po-
litical behavior, one considers that each individual tries
to maximize its personal benefit in the context of the
greater system. In other systems, such as foraging in-
sects, the net benefit to the colony as a whole is what is
likely maximized—this corresponds to the case where re-
sources may be redistributed, which in our model means
that the leader phase is always optimal for all parameter
values.
Even with these caveats, there are several systems
which could potentially be understood in the context of
our model: the behavior of social and hierarchical insects
compared to asocial insects[26, 27, 28], the distribution
of information in swarms[29], and innovation-sharing in
unicellular organisms via horizontal gene transfer[30, 31].
All of these cases involve some piece of information being
discovered by a single individual—a randomly chosen one
of a set of similar individuals in the case of swarm be-
havior (corresponding to the homogeneous phase), or via
directed searching by a specialized subset of the popula-
tion, as is the case in some foraging insects (correspond-
ing to the leader phase). We will now briefly discuss each
case.
Different species of insects are socialized to different
degrees. On one extreme, there are insects such as the
solitary wasps[26], which do not share resources or infor-
mation. On the other extreme, eusocial insects such as
bees, ants, and certain kinds of wasps have highly struc-
tured communication channels and vehicles of informa-
tion discovery. Foragers and scouts use various means
to communicate the location of food supplies or nesting
sites. The distinction here seems to be that bees and
ants reproduce centrally via a queen, and so maximizing
their interest corresponds to maximizing the interest of
the queen. As a result, resources can be redistributed
freely, and so we expect the system to emerge in the
leader phase - this is equivalent to a system of resource
subsidy as discussed earlier. ‘Trust’, here, is embodied in
the genetically programmed behaviors of the individuals
in following signals sent by other insects.
In the case of honey bees, the various scouts return
with information about potential food locations, after
which the swarm comes to a unified decision about which
site to pursue. The method of decision making seems
to be a weighted average[29], similar to what we use to
6model the decision making of our agents. Each scout
has a certain chance of finding the best site within a
given distance—even if they spend 100% of their time
searching, they have a limited maximum accuracy. This
corresponds to the fluctuating case in our model, so, as
the swarm size grows, we can predict that the optimal
number of scouts should scale logarithmically with the
swarm size.
Microbial organisms[32, 33] and even multicellular
eukaryotes[34, 35, 36, 37] have the ability to swap ge-
netic material and integrate it into their genomes via sev-
eral pathways, mediated often by mobile genetic elements
such as viruses and plasmids. There is cellular machin-
ery associated with this process, which can be active or
inactive in a given cell. In microbes, the state in which
such an organism is receptive to external DNA is called
genetic competence. The regulatory network associated
with competence has been shown to generate a distribu-
tion of cells with differing levels of competence[30]. A
small subset of the cells at any given time end up being
receptive to this information exchange, whereas the rest
remain closed. The competent subset changes with time,
so eventually, all cells will at some time be able to accept
foreign genetic material. This competence mechanism is
then the microbial analogue of ‘trust’ in our model. This
dynamic may be analogous to the leader phase in our
model. Here, the information amplification takes place
when a subset of cells exchange material and either live or
die as a result. The surviving exchanges are then passed
on to the local population, amplifying the induced infor-
mation. An analogous process to ‘taxation’ (e.g. resource
subsidy) may occur via a form of symbiosis or biofilm for-
mation, such that nutrient resources are shared.
CONCLUSIONS
We have shown that a model of communicating agents
that divide their time between information generation
and information usage has three distinct phases of orga-
nization corresponding to structures identifiable in hu-
man political systems. The flow of information between
agents in the system is critical to this phase structure.
If agents can exchange resources in a way that does not
permit cheating, then the optimal structure is to have a
small number of leaders that scales logarithmically with
the system size, and a larger number of workers. Fluctu-
ations in the reliability of agents tend to emphasize the
communal phase over the leader phase.
The phase transitions predicted by this model are all
first order in nature. As such, in a situation in which
the agents are approaching equilibrium dynamically, the
various phases can coexist over much of the parameter
space. This makes sense when one looks at the diversity
of actual political systems in existence, on both the local
and national scales. The transition to the leader phase
from a communal phase takes the form of an inhomoge-
neous decay in the levels of decision making of the agents
in the system, leaving one agent in charge by default. In
a dynamical version of this model in which the distribu-
tion of agents changes with time, the transition between
different leader agents could be studied.
This model has a relatively simple phase structure, as
only the thinking value and trust levels are allowed to
vary. The addition of spatial considerations, information
exchange costs, lying, resource exchange with cheating,
or other such factors could vastly increase the diversity
of phases exhibited by the model.
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8FIG. 1: Schematic phase diagram for our model. The In-
vestment axis is the degree that a large initial investment of
resources is needed to see an improvement in accuracy: this
corresponds to the nonlinearity α in the model. The benefit
axis is the total difference in accuracy between random guess-
ing and perfect knowledge, which corresponds to the variable
O in our model. In the Lazy Phase, random guessing is the
optimal behavior. In the Heterogeneous Phase, a subset of
agents dedicate their resources to thinking whereas the rest
of the agents dedicate their resources to working (division of
labor). In the Homogeneous Phase), all the agents dedicate
the same non-zero amount of resources to thinking.
FIG. 2: Score functions in the Isolated Phase as a function of
thinking time T , for four values of O and α. In the Isolated
Phase, each agent does not receive information from other
agents.
9FIG. 3: Score functions in the Homogeneous Phase as a func-
tion of thinking time T , for different numbers of agents N ,
with O = 5 and α = 5. In the Homogeneous Phase all agents
share information and have the same parameters.
FIG. 4: Phase diagram for O = 10 in the space of the nonlin-
earity α and number of agents N . The phase transition from
the heterogeneous phase as N increases is due to the commu-
nal phase being more efficient than a selfish leader phase. The
phase transition as α increases is due to the transition of the
isolated phase to a T = 0 phase. The dotted lines show the
phase boundaries when Gaussian fluctuations with a standard
deviation of 0.1 are added to the T value of each agent.
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FIG. 5: Phase diagram for N = 50 in the space of the nonlin-
earity α and thinking benefit O. The dotted lines show the
phase boundaries when Gaussian fluctuations with a standard
deviation of 0.1 are added to the T value of each agent.
FIG. 6: Optimal number of leaders as a function of total
number of agents for a system with O = 5 and two different
fluctuation strengths. In this case, the fluctuations are pa-
rameterized by the resultant average accuracy A of a leader
with T = 1.
